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Index Insurance, Production Practices, and Probabilistic 
Climate Forecasts 
 
Agricultural producers around the world face a variety of climate related risks. 
Climate risks, such as droughts, have profound impacts on developing countries, where 
agriculture usually makes a significant contribution to their gross domestic product,
 1 and 
insurance markets are under-developed or inexistent.
2   
There are virtually no examples of successful multiple peril crop insurance in the 
world without use of government funds, for example in the form of subsidies (Skees, 
Hazell, and Miranda; Hazell). Failures in traditional crop insurance have been attributed 
mainly to asymmetric information (Just, Calvin and Quiggin; Chambers; Knight and 
Coble), and the systemic nature of agricultural risks (Miranda and Glauber). The failure 
of crop insurance as a viable instrument to manage production risks launched a search for 
alternative instruments such as index insurance.
3 Index insurance is a generic term used 
to indicate that the insurance is written for a specific event such as area yield loss, rainfall 
deficits, etc, and not the actual loss (production or income) at the farm. The main 
difference from traditional crop insurance is that one or more events that cause losses are 
insured as a way to hedge production risks, but not the loss itself (Turvey).      
The viability of index insurance against climatic risk as an innovative alternative 
to traditional crop insurance is being intensely studied as a form to provide protection to 
agricultural producers in developing countries (see World Bank 2005 and the references 
                                                 
1 Agriculture accounted for 27% of GDP in low-income countries compared to only 2% in high-income 
countries (World Bank 2001). 
2 Since there is a large body of literature on the role of risk in agriculture (see e.g. Just and Pope; Moschini 
and Hennessy) it is worthwhile to note that there are several sources of risk that are relevant from the 
producer’s perspective, including production, price, technological, and policy uncertainties. The effect of 
price uncertainty due to random demand has received substantial attention (Ratti and Ullah; Pope and 
Kramer), with Sandmo’s article being salient to this area. Pope and Kramer argue that production 
uncertainty may have a larger impact than market uncertainty, especially since the advent modern price 
management tools such as hedging, forward contracting, etc. This is certainly true in countries where 
instruments to reduce the impacts of uncertainty such as crop insurance are under-developed or unavailable. 
Since our focus in the present article is on climate risks, a case of production uncertainty, we will assume 
that prices are non-random. 
3 Although the idea of index insurance is not new (it can be traced back to the work of Halcrow in the 40’s), 
it is now attracting increasing attention as an alternative to traditional crop insurance for developing 
countries.   3
therein).
4 One of the main drivers of this research is the belief that if farmers are offered 
affordable insurance, they will be able to invest more in inputs, and to choose higher 
return activities, providing means to escape poverty traps. Work in the agricultural 
economics literature has examined the relationship between insurance and input usage 
(especially nitrogen, but also pesticides) for both farm level (Ramaswami; Babcock and 
Hennessy; Horowitz and Lichtemberg; Smith and Goodwin) and index insurance 
(Chambers and Quiggin; Mahul). In the U.S., where it has been shown that farmers tend, 
based on ex-post evaluations, to over-apply nitrogen (Babcock 1992), the presence of 
insurance resulted in conflicting empirical results. Horowitz and Lichtemberg estimated 
that farmers who purchased insurance increased nitrogen applications by 19%, whereas 
both Babcock and Hennessy, and Smith and Goodwin find the opposite. Ramaswami 
concludes (through a conceptual model) that the presence of actuarially fair multiple peril 
crop insurance will have an indeterminate effect on the use of risk increasing inputs.
5 For 
the case of index insurance (against climate risks), where moral hazard issues are 
sidestepped, Mahul showed that insured farmers would use more (less) risk increasing 
(reducing) inputs than their uninsured counterparts. Chambers and Quiggin, analyze the 
effects of area-yield insurance on the producer’s decisions regarding their exposure to 
risk. The research just outlined does not consider the possible interaction between 
insurance, climate forecast, and input decisions.   
Recent research has shown that seasonal climate is predictable in many regions of 
the world (Goddard et al.). This seasonal predictability offers the potential to better 
manage climatic uncertainty through contingent choices of production (Hansen) and 
insurance practices.  Although it is recognized that improved skill in seasonal climate 
forecasting may have implications for the design and rating of index insurance on 
weather variables (Skees, Hazell, and Miranda), the effects are usually assumed away by 
claiming that it would suffice to close sales dates ahead of time. The claim usually makes 
reference to the lack of skill of long-lead forecasts (Hess and Syroka; World Bank 2005). 
However the actual relationship has not been formally studied. Work in agricultural and 
climate science has modeled the impact of probabilistic climate forecasts on the 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the pros and cons of index insurance see (Miranda; World Bank 2005). 
5 The moral hazard effect which would induce an insured farmer to use less of the input works in the 
opposite direction than the risk reduction effect.   4
production decisions and estimated the value of that information (e.g Solow et al.) but 
has, with few exceptions (Mjelde, Thompson, and Nixon; Cabrera, Letson, and Podesta 
(CLP)), ignored the potential impact of insurance. The two exceptions just mentioned 
relied on numerical simulations to analyze the impact of several government programs 
(including the US crop insurance) on the value of seasonal forecast information. CLP 
determined the optimal management practices in the absence of farm programs and 
climate information and then studied how a subset of the decision, and the resulting 
financial outcome where affected by ENSO phase and government programs. CLP 
followed an ex-post approach, since they considered the impact of different ENSO 
phases, but not of the climate forecasts.  
Opportunities for inter-temporal adverse selection in the context of the US yield 
insurance and based on different forecasts of the growing conditions for the coming 
season have been explored. Luo, Skees, and Marchant used a combination of soil water 
content and past and forecast weather to study the possibility of identifying poor growing 
conditions for corn in the Midwest early in the year. The authors argue that there is 
enough early season information to allow farmers to adversely select. In a later study, 
McGowan and Ker found that companies selling wheat yield insurance in Texas could 
use sea surface temperatures in order to adversely select against the US Risk 
Management Agency.  
Since the fundamental relationship between index insurance, input use, and 
seasonal climate forecasts has not been addressed, we propose to fill this gap by 
explicitly modeling input use and index insurance demand given probabilistic seasonal 
climate forecasts.  While seasonal climate forecasts, insurance contracts, and input use 
choices can each be used to mitigate uncertainty and risk, they each play a different role, 
and have potential synergies or unanticipated impacts when used together.  This is of 
particular relevance given the parallel efforts to improve the quality and availability of 
seasonal climate forecasts, establish index insurance markets, and encourage effective 
input use in developing countries.  
It is known that if an index insurance scheme is developed without recognizing 
the availability of forecasts and adjusting the timing or prices of contracts, the asymmetry 
of climate information may undermine the insurance system.  We find that if contracts   5
are appropriately designed there are important synergies between forecasts and insurance 
and effective input use.  Insurance allows the farmer to map a probabilistic forecast into a 
much more deterministic payout, allowing the farmer to commit to production choices 
that take advantage of forecast information that is too noisy to utilize without risk 
protection. With insurance, the farmer may be able intensify in potentially good years, 
and thus realize higher average payoffs.  When a forecast can increase productivity or the 
value of insurance, an infeasible index insurance system may become workable, which 
may have particular relevance in infant insurance markets in developing countries.  
We investigate the fundamental relationship just described through a model of input 
choice, forecasts, and index insurance.  The model is highly stylized in order to most 
clearly represent fundamental features.  We derive optimal input and insurance demand 
as a function of forecast quality and determine production changes with respect to the 
absence of forecast information and insurance.  We also determine under what conditions 
insurance, forecasts, and inputs complement or substitute for each other, identify the 
potential synergies or conflicting impacts. 
 
Preliminaries and Base Model 
Consider first a competitive farmer with a single crop which has a yield dependent on the 
level of a controllable input (N , hereafter nitrogen, but may be thought of as an 
improved seed, or the level of technology employed) and some weather variable 
(hereafter rainfall). The value of the weather variable is learned after the input has been 
applied. For simplicity assume that rainfall ( ) r  can only take two values,  H r  and  L r  
(subscripts denote high and low respectively). The farmer knows that the historical 
probability of observing  H rr =  is  H ω . Profits for the farmer are 
  () ( ) ,, N Nr p f Nr pN π =− ,  H rr =  or  L rr = , 
where  p  is the (nonrandom) output price,  N p  is the price of the input, and  () f i  
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. We assume further that  ( )() ,, H L f Nr f Nr > , and 
()() ,, NHNL f Nr f Nr >  for all N .  
The farmer is assumed risk averse with a Bernoulli utility function given by  ( ) u π , with 
() () '' 0 ' uu π π ≤< .  
If the farmer’s choice is on the level of the input to apply, his/her problem and necessary 
conditions (for an interior solution) are  
  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) max , 1 , HH N H L N N Eu u pf N r p N u pf N r p N πω ω =− + − −  (1) 
  () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
** ** ', 1 ', 0
HL
HN H N H N L N up f N r p up f N r p ωπ ω π − +− − = . (2) 
Here  () ,
i
i Nr ππ = ,  , iL H = , and  ( )
** ,
i
i Nr ππ = . Since marginal utilities are positive, it 
must be that marginal profits are positive for one realization of rainfall and negative for 
the other. The assumption that marginal productivity of nitrogen in higher when rainfall 
is not limiting crop production implies that the first term in equation (2) is positive, 
whereas the second is negative. In other words, the farmer would be under-applying 
(over-applying) nitrogen in good (bad) rainfall years. The farmer is engaging is self-
insurance, that is, by choosing the level of inputs in this fashion they are reducing the 
magnitude of the loss when one occurs (Ehrlich and Becker). Notice that this is true for 
both risk-neutral and risk averse producers. As is well known, a risk neutral producer will 
equate marginal costs to expected marginal revenues (i.e. he/she will choose 
*N N  such 
that  ()() ( )
** ,, 0
NN
HN H LN L N pf N r f N r p ωω +− = ).
6 However, it can be shown (see the 
appendix) that 
** N NN < .
7 That is, the input under consideration is risk increasing in the 
sense that a risk-averse producer uses less of it than a risk-neutral producer (Pope and 
Kramer 1979). Note that this result does not depend on having only two states of the 
world (see the appendix). The next section introduces the climate forecast, and studies 
                                                 
6 As is well known, whether the risk neutral producer will increase or decrease his/her input usage under a 
mean preserving increase in risk depend on the curvature of the marginal production function with respect 
to the source or risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz ). 
7 The same result was obtained by Ratti and Ullah, using additional assumptions on the elasticity of the 
marginal product curve of the factors. Mjelde, Thompson, and Nixon’s numerical simulations results 
yielded risk averse producers using less nitrogen than risk neutral farmers.   7
how it affects the decision of the amount of inputs to use and the associated welfare 
change. 
 
Introducing Climate Forecasts 
Suppose now that a skillful probabilistic climate forecast is available to the risk averse 
farmer before decisions over the controllable input are made. The forecast indicates the 
future state of the world (high or low rainfall) and an associated uncertainty given by the 
probability that the forecast is incorrect. For example, if high rainfalls are forecasted, 
there is probability  H H ω  that rainfall is actually high and a complement  1 LH HH ω ω =−  
that realized rainfall is low. A skillful forecast is captured by the assumption that 
H HH ω ω > , and  L LL ω ω > . Assume also that the forecast is unbiased in the sense that the 
frequency with which a high rainfall forecast is issued ( H m ) equals the frequency of high 
rainfall years (i.e.  H H m ω = ).  
In this situation, the decision of the farmer will depend on the forecast received. If a good 
year is forecasted, the decision of the farmer boils down to maximizing expected utility 
of profits, given the forecast as  
  ( ) () ( ) ( ) () ( ) max , 1 , HN LN HH HH N Eu H u pf N r p N u pf N r p N πω ω =− + − − . 
The first order condition for this problem is 
 
() () ( ) ( )






HN N HN HH
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LN N LN HH
u p f N rp Np f N rp







*H N  is the optimal amount of nitrogen application when a good year is forecasted. 
That amount will depend on the skill of the forecast. Again we find that the farmer self 
insures by applying less than the amount of nitrogen that would maximize profits if it was 
known with certainty that rainfall is going to be high (marginal profits are positive 
(negative) when realized rainfall is high (low)). From equation (3), if the forecast have no 
skill (i.e.  H HH ω ω =  then the farmer will apply the same amount of nitrogen as if the 
forecast is not available (compare with equation (2)). An analogous problem can be 
written for the case where a low rainfall year is forecasted.    8
In this framework, it is straightforward to show that as the forecast becomes more 
skillful, the amount of nitrogen applied departs more from the decision without the 
forecast. For the high rainfall case, a forecast of higher skill will be obtained when  H H ω  







. By the implicit function theorem, and since the 
second order conditions for a maximum hold,  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )








H HN N HN
HH H
HH LN N LN
up fN r p N p f N r p N
u p f N rp N p f N rp ω
 −− −  ∂  =≥ 
  ∂ −−  
. 
Analogously, it can be shown that the amount of nitrogen applied when a low rainfall 
forecast is issued is lower that what it is applied in the absence of a forecast, and that 
difference increases with the skill of the forecast. The skillful forecast is allowing 
producers to reduce the degree to which they self-insure. Increasing the skill of the 
forecast will reduce the uncertainty, and move the amount of nitrogen application 
towards what would be applied if the future state of the world were known. The ex-ante 
total amount of nitrogen applied can be higher or lower than in the absence of a forecast 
depending on the relative probabilities and on the skill of the forecast.  
It can also be shown that in this simple scenario without price effects (see Babcock, 
1990), that the forecast increases producers welfare. The welfare change from 
introducing a skillful forecast is expressed in terms of the change in expected utility as 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,1 HH Eu s m Eu H m Eu L Eu π ππ π ∆= + − − , (4) 
where s is the skill of the forecast,  ( ) Eui π ,  , iH L =  denotes the expected utility when 
a good, or bad year is forecasted respectively, and  ( ) Eu π  is the expected utility if the 
forecast is not available, or is not used. Equation (4) is clearly positive, indicating that the 
skillful forecast improves producer’s welfare. In the absence of any skill, the production 
decisions with and without forecast coincide and equation (3) is zero. Equation (4) is 
non-decreasing in the skill of the forecast (s), indicating that information benefits 
producers in this case (see the appendix).  
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Introducing Insurance 
Suppose now that insurance becomes available to the producers, who must decide how 
much of it to buy (and no forecast is issued). In this case the objective function and first-
order conditions (at an interior solution) are 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, max , 1 ,
H HH L NI E u uN r I uN rII π ωπ τ ω π τ =− + − + −  (5) 
  () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
** * * :' , ' 1 , 0
HL
HN H N L N L N Nu I p f N rp u I p f N rp ωπτ ωπ τ −− + + − − = (6) 
  ( )
()
















Equation (7) implies that insurance will be demanded only if the deflated price of 
insurance (RHS) is lower than the marginal rate of substitution between income in the 
good to the bad rainfall year without insurance  ( ) ( ) ''
H L uu π π .
8 
 If the insurance is actuarially fair ( 1 H τ ω = − ), one obtains the standard result that the 
risk averse producer insures fully ( )
** * HL I π π =−.
9 This results is analogous to 
proposition 2 in Mahul (with independent risks), where the trigger for the insurance is the 
maximum value of the weather variable, and the slope of the indemnity function with 
respect to the index equals its marginal productivity (given an input decision). When the 
producer is able to insure fully, equation (6) can be rewritten as  
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
** * ', , 0
H
HN H LN L N u I pf N r pf N r p πτ ω ω −+ − = . 
Thus, the choice of inputs will coincide to those of a risk neutral decision maker. Since 
we showed that the risk neutral producer will use less inputs that his/her risk neutral 
counterpart this implies that total output will increase as a result of the availability of an 
actuarially fair insurance. Under the assumption that the insurance is actuarially fair, and 
the absence of price effects (area is assumed small, relative to world production) all the 
welfare gains are captured by the producer. In reality, the premium rate will be above the 
                                                 
















9 If the insurance is actuarially fair, the RHS of equation (7) is one, and the marginal utilities of wealth are 
equalized across states of the world.    10
actuarially fair rate, and the degree to which farmers decrease the amount of insurance 
purchased is determined by his/her risk preferences. In this line, a more risk averse 
producer will modify less his/her decision than a less risk averse. In a sense, a more risk 
averse will have a lower demand elasticity for the insurance. However, it can be shown, 
that for any given amount of insurance purchased, the amount of the input applied is 
higher than the optimal choice in the absence of insurance, even when the premium is not 
actuarially fair. To see this, subtract equation (2) from equation (6) for an arbitrary 
amount of insurance purchased (I ), and plug the optimal solution for equation (2) 
(
* N ).
10 After rearranging this yields  
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () ( )
***
** *
,' ( , ) ' ( , )
, '(, ) '(, ) 0
HN H N H H
LN L N L L
p f Nr p u Nr I u Nr
p f Nr p u Nr I I u Nr
ωπ τ π
ωπ τ π
 −− − 
 +− + − − > 
, 
implying that the producer should increase the amount of nitrogen applied to maximize 
expected utility. Hence, the introduction of insurance will result in a supply expansion in 
this model, even if it is not actuarially fairly priced. When the insurance market is not 
competitive, the rents generated by the insurance will by divided between the insurance 
company(ies) and the producers. The fraction of the rent captured by each sector depends 
on the producer’s risk preferences, technologies, and the degree of market power of the 
insurance companies.    
When actuarially fair insurance is available, the producer is able to remove all uncertainty 
and lock his realized income at  ( ) 1
H
H L




H u ω πω π +− .  The next section shows the impact of the introduction of a 
skillful and unbiased climate forecast. 
Combining the Insurance and Climate Forecast 
Abstract first from production decisions, that is, only insurance purchase decisions are 
made. In this case the farmer obtains high profits 
H π  with probability  H ω , and low 
profits 
L π  with the complementary probability. If there is no forecast available, or if it is 
released after the insurance purchase decision is made, the problem for the farmer is 
                                                 
10 In essence we are subtracting zero from equation (6) evaluated at the amount of nitrogen that would be 
chosen if no insurance was available (or purchased).     11
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) max 1
H
HL
H I Eu u I u I I π ωπτ ω π τ =− + − + − . 
The necessary condition for an interior solution is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) '1 ' 1 1 0
HL
HH uI u I ωπτ τ ω π τ τ −− + − + − − = . 
If the premium rate is actuarially fair (i.e.  LI τ ω = ), the producer will insure fully setting 
* H L I π π =− , and income is locked across state of the world at the expected value of 
wealth  (1 )
H L
HH ω πω π +− . 
Assume next that advances in climate science allow for skillful forecast to be released 
before the closing date for the insurance purchase. If the insurance is going to be 
financially sustainable, the premium rates need to be modified to reflect the climate 
information available. If premiums rates do not reflect the information, and buyers have 
the ability to process the forecast, the latter will insure at higher (lower) rates when a bad 
(good) year is forecasted, rendering the product unsustainable. Insurers, who are more 
likely to have access and capabilities to understand the forecasts, can not afford to ignore 
it if they believe potential insurance buyers will use it in their decisions. This is especially 
true for index insurance, which has been touted as a tool that could be used to anybody to 
hedge risks (Skees et al.). For this type of products it is likely that some potential buyers 
have access to the information and adversely select, making the provision of index 
insurance commercially unviable. It is possible that the insurance company has access to 
and better capabilities to interpret the forecast than farmers. If the insurance company 
uses the forecast to modify premium rates and this is not interpreted by farmers as a 
signal that the odds for the good and bad years have changed, the effectiveness of the 
insurance as a risk management tool will be undermined. The farmer will perceive the 
insurance to be relatively cheap (expensive) when a good (year) is forecasted and buy 
more (less) of it. In this line, farmers will end up with lower levels of insurance when it is 
needed the most. Another problem with this is the fact that farmers may see the insurance 
company as merely trying to extract rents after observing a varying premium when they 
do not perceive a change in the risks. We do not deal with this problem here, but it may 
be wise for insurance companies that need to adjust premiums following a forecast to 
clearly convey the forecast information to farmers.    12
  If the insurance decision is made after the forecast is released, and both parties use it, 
the problem will be state contingent. When a good year is forecasted, the actuarially fair 
rate is lowered from  L τ ω =  to  1 LH τ ω =  and the farmer’s problem and first order 
conditions are  
  () ( ) ( ) () ( ) 11 max 1 1
HL




















Since the insurance is actuarially fair, the producer will again insure fully setting 




H π πτ ππ =− −.  
If a bad year is forecasted, and the premium rates reflect it (defining  21 L LL τ ωω τ => > ), 
an analogous problem can be written yielding that the producer will insure fully and be 




L π πτ ππ =− −.  
Since the forecast is assumed to the unbiased, the ex-ante expected wealth in this scenario 
equals that that would result in the absence of a forecast,
11 however the farmer is no 
longer able to lock his/her income across forecasts. Hence, to the extent that the farmer is 
unable to modify his/her production practices in response to the forecast, the existence of 
the information will harm the farmer, unless he/she is able to purchase the insurance 
before the forecast is released.
12 The effect is magnified in the case discussed above when 
the premium rate is modified by the insurance company following a forecast that does not 
shift the farmer’s belief with regards to the probabilities of experiencing a bad year. In 
that case, expected profits are the same as in the two scenarios just discussed, but the 
farmer is not able to stabilize his/her income even within a given forecast. The insurance 
company will be indifferent (if risk neutral and charging actuarially fair premiums) 
between all scenarios. 
                                                 
11 To see this note that  ( ) ( )( ) ()
** * *
12 1 2 1
HH H
HH H L Em I m I I mm π πτ πτ π τ τ =− + − − = −+ . 
Using the assumption that the forecast is unbiased yields  12 H LL mmm τ τ + = .  
12 Note also that we assumed thus far in this section that farmers cannot modify their input choices 
following the forecast. If they can adjust management practices, the forecast may allow them to obtain 
higher expected profits, and then it is a trade-off between risks and returns whose net balance will depend 
on risk preferences.   13
In this scenario, it is optimal for farmers to buy the insurance before the forecast is 
released and insurance companies adjust their premiums accordingly. As such, there 
would be no need to close the sales period beforehand. But the advocated measure (of 
closing sales period before forecast is released would obviously be needed when the 
premium cannot be adjusted guided by the forecast. In fact, the analysis indicates that 
from a welfare standpoint the sales period should be opened before climate information 
becomes available.  
Suppose next, that the insurance purchase decision has to be made before any skillful 
forecast is available. The insurance is thus priced used climatology probabilities. In this 
case the producer faces a two stage problem. In the first stage, the producer chooses how 
much insurance to buy, and then he/she needs to choose how much of the input to use. If 
the latter decision needs to be made before the forecast is released, the producer is 
simultaneously choosing both variables. This case boils down to the model presented in 
equation (5), and the forecast has no value when producers cannot adjust their decision in 
response to the received information.  If the choice of how much input to use is made 
after the forecast is available, there is a two stage optimization process. In the first stage, 
the amount of insurance is decided. Then the forecast is released and producers make 
their input decisions. Finally nature decides the state of the world. We use backward 
induction to solve the problem. 
For the second stage, after the forecast is released, the problem of the producer is to 
choose the amount of nitrogen to use. The objective and first order conditions when a 
good year is forecasted are 
 
() ( ) ( )





Eu H u pf N r p N I
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1', 1 , 0
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up fN r p N Ip f N r p




−− + − − =
 (9) 
Equation (9) reveals that even in the presence of insurance, the producers will choose to 
self-insure against the possibility of an erroneous forecast.
13 The amount of nitrogen is 
                                                 
13 Unless of course the producer is fully insured through market insurance. This can only occur for one of 
the possible realizations of the forecast.   14
too low (high) compared to the profit maximizing level in the good (bad) year. To 
investigate how the choice of the input is affected to the amount of insurance previously 









∂  is the same as that of the partial derivative of equation (9) with respect to the 
amount of insurance available. This derivative is 
  () () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( )()
'' * '' * ,1 , 1 0
HH
HN H N LN L N HH HH u p fN r p u p fN r p ωτ ω τ −⋅ − + − ⋅ − − > .(10) 
The inequality is obtained because the self-insurance decision implies that producer’s 
marginal valuation of the input exceeds (is lower than) the price of the input in a good 
(bad) year and because the producers are risk averse.  
 Equation (10) indicates that insurance and a forecast for a good year reinforce each other 
in the decision of how much input to apply. The insurance allows the producer to take 
more risk in the presence of forecast uncertainty by applying larger amounts nitrogen. 
When a good year is forecasted, both instruments provide incentives for the producer to 
apply an amount of nitrogen more in-line with what would be applied if it were known 
with certainty that a good year was coming. In essence, the insurance is allowing the 
producer to “go for it” when a high forecast is issued.  
The previous result of insurance and forecast working in the same direction is not 
observed however when a bad year is forecasted. In a bad year forecast the problem and 
first order conditions are  
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. 
As in the case when the high forecast is issued, the producer will increase the amount of 





∂ > ∂ ). We showed before that a skillful low forecast will lead to lower amounts of 
nitrogen applied compared to the no forecast case. The presence of insurance will work in   15
the opposite direction. The intuition is that the insurance is protecting the producer in the 
case the forecast is right, and hence allows that producer to take more chances and try to 
capture part of the gains that would be available if the forecast is wrong. How the amount 
of nitrogen applied compares to the case where no forecast and no insurance are available 
depends on the amount of insurance purchased in the previous period and the skill of the 
forecast.   
Armed with the rules of the second period problem, the first period objective function can 
be written as  
() () () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
** * *
** * *
max , , (1 )
(1 ) , , (1 )
HH H H
HH N L N HH LH I
LL L L
HH N L N HL LL
Eu m u pf N r p N I u pf N r p N I
m u pf N r p N I u pf N r p N I
πω τ ω τ
ωτ ω τ
=− − + − + −
+− − − + − +−
Here, 
*i N ,  , iL H =  are the optimal solution for the second stage problem after a low or 
high forecast are released respectively. They are both functions of I . The first order 
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Equation (11) is 
() () ( ) () ( )() { }
() () () () () () { }
** * *
** * *
', ', 1 1
', ', 1 1 0
HH H H
HH N L N HH LH
LL L L
LH N L N HL LL
m u pf N r p N I u pf N r p N I
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If the forecast has no skill, the problem is the same as under no forecast, and the amount 
of insurance purchased will be the same as under the objective equation (5) i.e. 
( ) ( )
** * ,, H L I Nr Nr ππ =− . If the forecast is perfect, the producer will fully insure 
(remember that the insurance decision and pricing is made before the forecast is released) 
at the level  () ( )
** * ,,
FH L
H L I Nr Nr ππ =− . Contrary to expectations, it is possible that 
more insurance is purchased when a more skillful forecast is available. Comparing the 
amount of insurance purchased under both scenarios, the producer will purchase more 
insurance when a perfect forecast is available than without the forecast (even when the 
premium rates are the same under both scenarios), when the profit differential (between   16
good and bad states of the world) under the forecast is greater than when the forecast is 
not available. Alternatively, the forecast will induce the producer (ceteris paribus) to buy 
more insurance whenever the gains obtained when the good state of the world is 
forecasted exceed gains for a forecasted bad year, both compared against the no forecast 
scenario. That is, the forecast will induce producers to buy more insurance whenever  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () () ( ) ()
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, 
which is entirely plausible. 
 
Conclusions 
Agricultural producer around the globe face a variety of risks, including those related to 
price, production, market, technology, and policies. The focus of this article is on a 
particular kind of production risks, namely climate risks. The failure of the development 
of commercially viable traditional crop insurance products and innovations in financial 
markers has fed a renewed interest in the search for alternatives to help producers in 
developing countries manage their risk exposure. Salient among these is the proposal of 
several index insurance schemes against weather events (World Bank, 2005). Among the 
basic tenets are that the presence of insurance allows producers to intensify their 
operations and invest in higher returns but riskier activities. Also, insurance will reduce 
the risks of default and hence may induce creditors to offer loans at affordable rates. The 
two factors combined are touted as key to help producers in developing countries escape 
poverty traps.  
A great amount of effort has been devoted to the study of the interaction between 
insurance (in particular traditional yield insurance) and input decisions. Work has also 
explored the relationship between climate forecasts and input usage. Much less is known 
about the interaction between insurance, in particular index insurance, and climate 
forecasts. Few articles have explored the interaction between climate forecast, input 
usage, and insurance. These studies, which relied on numerical simulations, were focused 
on determining the value of improved climate forecast. This paper contributes to our 
understanding of the fundamental interactions between index insurance, climate 
forecasts, and input decisions.      17
Our main findings are that insurance and skillful climate forecast may have synergistic or 
antagonistic effects on the input decisions by producers. Insurance (in the absence of 
moral hazard effects) will induce producers to use more of a risk increasing input such as 
nitrogen. The presence of a skillful probabilistic climate forecast may result in a net 
increase or decrease of inputs used. When a good year is forecasted, both the forecast and 
insurance act to increase the amount of nitrogen applied. If a bad year is forecasted, both 
institutions work in opposite direction. Additionally, we find that if an actuarially fair 
insurance is available, and producer’s profits are not sufficiently responsive to the input 
mix, the introduction of a climate forecast harms the producer if the premiums reflect the 
forecast (even if they are actuarially fair). The intuition is that producers are able to lock 
their income at the expected wealth when the insurance parameters do not depend on the 
forecast, whereas the state contingent premium prevents producers from doing that. 
Hence, a necessary condition for producers to prefer a state contingent commercially 
viable insurance product is that producers can increase their profits by taking account the 
forecast information. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that forecast information may induce 
producers to buy more insurance. The intuition is that the forecast may widen the wedge 
between optimized profits among states of the world. 
Observation of insurance transactions may provide information on forecast value.  
Alternately, insurance prices may provide a mechanism to effectively communicate 
forecast information when farmers do not have direct access to forecast, which may occur 
in a developing country with limited communications infrastructure.  Future work 
addressing these issues may be worthwhile. 
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. 
The ratio of marginal utilities is at least one since profits increase with the amount of 
rainfall and hence the last term is positive. From the first order condition of the risk 
neutral producer, marginal profits for the low rainfall year are negative, and thus the 
overall equation is negative. This shows that in order to maximize expected utility of 
profits, a risk averse producer will choose a lower level of inputs that his/her risk neutral 
counterpart.    
Alternatively, the proof can be expressed in a way that makes it clear that the result is not 
dependent on having only two states of the world. The first order condition for the risk 
averse producer can be written as  ( )
** '( ( , ) )( ( , ) ) 0
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risk neutral producer will choose 
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Proof of  () ,0 Eu s π ∆≥ .   21
() Eu π  is unaffected by the skill of the forecast, and hence we focus on the expected 
utility in the presence of a forecast. The value function for producer in this case is  
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  and by the envelope theorem,  
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, the previous equation can be rewritten as  
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, and the term in 
braces is the difference in expected utility of profits for the case where the forecast is 
correct and that resulting when the forecast turns out to be wrong.  
  
 